

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, Pages removed for the following reason: (b)(1)1.4a.g (b)(1)1.4a, Pages removed for the following reason: (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(1)1.5a

FWD TO: (b)(1)1.4a

DTG: 210845zFEB07

PATROL TYPE: Downed Aircraft Recovery

Patrol LDR: (b)(1)1.4a

CALL SIGN (b)(1)1.4a

SP: 180030zFEB07 RP: 200900zFEB07

ELEMENTS: (b)(1)1.4a

OTHER ELEMENTS: EOD

MISSION

(b)(1)1.4a secures downed MH-47 vic (b)(1)1.4a NOT prevent loss of sensitive equipment / information or use for enemy IO campaign.

EXECUTION INFO

At approximately 2330z on 17 FEB 07 the QRF Platoon Leader woke me and told me to that he was going to secure a downed MH-47 and that I was needed in the TOC. Assuming that I was going to have to re-constitute a QRF I awoke (b)(1)1.4a and told him to get his platoon prepared to assume QRF and then went to the TOC. At the TOC (b)(1)1.4a informed me that I needed to get a platoon and some medics and move to the aircraft site to conduct ground CASEVAC to (b)(1)1.4a while (b)(1)1.4a secured the site. I alerted 1st and 2nd PLT for the mission and had 4th PLT prepare to move if needed do to the limited number of casualties that we can carry per PLT. We were initially told that there were 10 killed and at least 12 injured and that the dead had already been evacuated. At 180030zFEB07 1st and 2nd PLTs with (b)(1)1.4a and moved south on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a arrived at the crash site vic. (b)(1)1.4a and found that (b)(1)1.4a had established single vehicle TCPs to the north and south of the crash site which was about 50m to the northwest of (b)(1)1.4a. Enroute I was informed that there were MEDEVAC aircraft inbound to the crash site. I initially order 1st PLT to establish a TCP to the south and 2nd PLT to establish a TCP to the north and planned to use (b)(1)1.4a to move casualties to the aircraft. There were two HH-60 aircraft on the ground loading casualties when we arrived. I moved immediately to the crash site with the BN PA and five medics. I sent an initial report to (b)(1)1.5a TOC then moved to the crash site. At the crash site I located (b)(1)1.4a and four Air Force PJs at the CCP and got a count of total patients. They initially reported that there were 21 pax on the air craft nine patients (at least 2 KIA) evacuated on the first lift, four patients in the CCP (2 KIA, 2 WIA), and they were still looking for patients in the wreckage. I moved to the wreckage and found the company senior medic, (b)(1)1.4a triaging patients on the tail ramp, while numerous other soldiers extricated casualties and remains from the air craft.

(b)(1)1.4a informed me that he didn't need any help on the TCPs, so we had (b)(1)1.5a provide all available soldiers to form aid and litter teams. I moved back to my vehicle to send the initial patient count to (b)(1)1.5a TOC and was informed that the aircraft manifest had 22 pax, meaning either our count or the manifest was wrong. The medics and other soldiers continued to evaluate and treat casualties and cut patients and remains out of the wreckage. I moved back to the crash site and instructed (b)(1)1.4a to get an updated count of KIA and WIA on the ground. His count came out to six KIA and eight WIA. Added to the nine already evacuated that came to a total of 23. At this point he realized that they did not have an accurate count of the number evacuated on the first lift. After comparing counts with the PJs they determined that there were eight personnel evacuated on the first lift and at least two were KIA. I moved back to my vehicle and reported the accurate patient count. At the same time, around, 0200z a CH-47 came in and evacuated all the remaining WIA and KIA except the pilot who was still trapped in the wreckage.

Once the wounded were evacuated we began consolidating all weapons, sensitive items and personal effects from the aircraft. We called in (b)(1)1.4a to bring a 5-ton to evacuate the equipment, a wrecker to extricate

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

WHICH I, (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
 FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
 BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
 CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT
 THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)MENT.

(b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)
 Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to
 administer oaths, this _____ day of _____,
 at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

 (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

 (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

 (Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

PAGE OF PAGES

EXECUTION INFO CONTINUED

the pilot and EOD to blow the aircraft if required. As we were waiting for them, the PJs searched through the wreckage and located extraction tools (jaws of life and heavy lift kits). Once they found the tools, they began to cut the pilot out of the wreckage. Eventually they had to use the jaws of life and a pocket knife to amputate the pilot's leg in order to remove his body from the wreckage. When [REDACTED] arrived we upload all the equipment that had been evacuated and conducted a final search of the wreckage for remaining equipment. [REDACTED] departed with the 5-ton and the wrecker.


I released [REDACTED] to move back to the FOB, established TCPs north and south of the wreckage with 1st PLT, and used 2nd PLT to continue to sort through the wreckage. The PJs took pictures of the wreckage, removed crypto devices, loaded their equipment and the remains of the pilot on two HH-60s that landed and then left the scene. During this time, about a platoon of ANA arrived and asked if they could assist, so we included them in our security plan. [REDACTED] so brought ANP from [REDACTED] to assist in TCPs and a squad of ANP from [REDACTED] arrived to assist in TCPs. At that time we were told not to destroy the aircraft and to continue to secure the site until we received instructions. EOD began removing all COMSEC devices, the flight data recorder and any avionics and electronic equipment that could be removed. During that time another UH-60 aircraft landed with two PJs who thought there was a body to be removed. We informed them that the pilot's remains had been removed. They took some more pictures then left. At approximately 1100z two CH-47s landed and a pilot and flight engineer from [REDACTED] landed to assess the aircraft. They removed a few additional devices from the aircraft and said that they would recommend blowing the aircraft in place and showed EOD specific places where charges needed to be placed in order to destroy components that could not be removed. They left at approximately 1400z. We continued to secure the aircraft throughout the night awaiting instructions for the destruction of the aircraft. During the night the [REDACTED] ANP left.

On 19 FEB we continued to secure the aircraft and EOD prepared charges in anticipation of being ordered to destroy the aircraft. During the day an Associated Press crew arrived and asked to take pictures and conduct an interview. We informed them that they would not be allowed to take pictures and that we would not permit any interviews. We confirmed that there had been an aircraft accident. They were told to leave, but were then observed taking pictures. 2nd PLT moved to their vehicle, conducted a search of the pax and the vehicle, then erased all pictures and forced them to move on. Late in the day [REDACTED] arrived to assess the scene. [REDACTED] conducted Class I / III resupply and [REDACTED] moved back to [REDACTED]. At approximately 1226z, as we were breaking down our TCPs and turning them over to the ANA, I heard a burst of .50 cal fire from the northern TCP. I immediately moved to the TCP and determined that the TCP had fired on a jingle truck that had run through both the ANA TCP and their position. The driver of the truck was killed instantly and the passenger was severely wounded. We called in a MEDEVAC for the wounded passenger and secured the scene. The ANA BN XO arranged for the removal of the driver's body and notified the truck company to remove the truck. After the passenger was evacuated, we pulled into a perimeter for the night. No other details of this incident are included due to the ongoing investigation into the circumstances of the shooting.

At 1930z we received permission to destroy the aircraft. We established blocking positions north and south of the wreckage outside of the MSD (500m) and cleared the only inhabited compound in the MSD, an ANP checkpoint. After ensuring accountability of all pax and equipment, EOD initiated the charges. The aircraft burned for approximately 5 hours. After assessing the aircraft and determining that some large pieces need to be destroyed, EOD prepped additional charges. At 200330z FEB 07 EOD completed setting the charges and we blocked the MSR and destroyed the remaining pieces. Once complete we established TCPs north and south of the wreckage, established a perimeter around the wreckage and allowed traffic through the MSR. Later that morning [REDACTED] arrived on the scene, inspected the wreckage and the site of the shooting and then left. At approximately 0730z [REDACTED] arrived with two squads, three jingle trucks, a 5-ton, a crane, and a wrecker. I oriented them to the sight and the security plan, then they took over security and began loading the debris. [REDACTED] SP'd the wreckage at approximately 0830z and RTB to [REDACTED] without incident.

(b)(1) 1.4a

EXECUTION INFO CONTINUED



(b)(1) 1.4a

(b)(1) 1.4a

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(b)(1)

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(b)(1) 1.4a

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AF 130-45, the proponent agency is PWG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION BAGRAM AIR BASE	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20070301	3. TIME 1520	4. FILE NUMBER
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5. (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

8. (b)(1)1.4a

9. (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

I, [REDACTED] MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ARRIVED AT THE JDL FOR DUTY AT 2150Z. WAS INQUIRED THAT (b)(1)1.4a REPORTED (b)(1)1.4a HAD GND FAILURE AND HAD SHOT DOWN AND (b)(1)1.4a WERE GOING TO (b)(1)1.4a FOR FUEL. THROUGH THE FIRES DESK FIF AND AC130 CALLED OVER TO SCENE. FIF COMMUNICATE THROUGH MIRC TO THE FIREFIGHTER UNITS OPS WHICH IS THEN RELAYED TO THE JDL FIRES DESK. NO DIRECT CONTACT W/ A/C UNTIL AC130 ARRIVED THE FIF HAD CONTACT WITH A PJ ON THE GROUND (ONE OF THE PERSONNEL ON THE HELO). THIS WAS THE FIRST CONFIRMATION ANY SURVIVORS I BELIEVE THAT BY THE TIME I ARRIVED AT THE JDL THE GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA (QRF) WERE NOTIFIED. I REMEMBER THERE WAS A LOT OF FRUSTRATION BECAUSE THE GND FORCE, WE DIDN'T KNOW IF THEY LEFT OR NOT. IN THE END THE SECOND QRF (PLT SIZED) DEPARTED AT 2357Z AND ARRIVED AFTER THE MEDICAL AIRCRAFT. THE SECOND QRF LEFT OVER 40 MIN AFTER THE FIRST (QRF CONSISTING OF TWO VEA).

FIFs AND MC130s COULD NOT SEE THE GROUND. ONE OF THE JDLs FIRST CONCERN WAS TO GET "EYES ON" THE HELO BUT NO ONE HAD VISUAL UNTIL THE MEDICAL AIRCRAFT ARRIVED.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIAL [REDACTED]

MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Authority: The general authority for soliciting this information is 10 USC § 3012. More specific authority(ies) may exist.

Purpose: The purpose(s) for soliciting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the commander in determining what action to take with regard to:

MISAP OF (b)(1)1.4a 17 FEB 07 AND THE RESULTING CASUALTIES

Failure to disclose:

For soldiers and civilians not being advised of their Article 31, UCMJ rights and civilians not being advised of the 5th Amendment rights: Providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or Army regulations or applicable civilian personnel regulations.

For soldiers and civilians being advised of their Article 31, UCMJ rights and civilians being advised of the 5th Amendment rights: Providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than that certain information might not otherwise be available to the commander for his or her decision in this matter.

Routine Uses: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

DATE 1 MAR 07
1545Z

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

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HOUR
2115z

DATE
17 FEB 2007

HOUR
2314z

DATE
17 FEB 2007

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
1	2115		(b)(1)1.4a RPTS (b)(1)1.4a (172), HAD A TOTAL ENGINE FAIL 20 NM SOUTH OF (b)(1)1.4a ARE CURRENTLY LOOKING FOR A SPOT TO LAND vic 18 NM SW OF (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a RPT (b)(1)1.4a HAD A #2 ENG FAILURE. AND WX IS 0/0 PUSHING ON TO (b)(1)1.4a NO COMMS (b)(1)1.4a ATT. ETA (b)(1)1.4a 2000z TO REFUEL.		
2	2136		(b)(1)1.4a WILL LAUNCH IN 35 MIN., WILL BE OVER TARGET IN		
3	2140		(b)(1)1.4a ASKS 89 HOW MANY PAX ANSWER WAS 16 INCLUDING CSAR TM.		
4	2148		(b)(1)1.4a REQUEST WX SW OF (b)(1)1.4a WX AS FOLLOWS: RPTS FEW 036, BKN 040, BKN 055, WINDS 050/10KNOTS VIS 6 MILES W/ RAIN.		
5	2204		(b)(1)1.4a ARRIVE (b)(1)1.4a		
6	2209		(b)(1)1.4a DP ATT		
7	2230		based on (b)(1)1.4a tasked to investigate (b)(1)1.4a estimated 3 mile trail of lead at report of (b)(1)1.4a		
8	2237		(b)(1)1.4a RPT BKN HIP UNABLE TO MOVE W/ MULTIPLE SURVIVORS vic (b)(1)1.4a		
9	2242		words passed to that no current ETA for RW recovery assets DUE TO WX		
10	2243		CURRENT WX: 500-28,000' w/ imbedded thunderstorms in venty, Visibility 1 mile in Snow, Expect clouds to scatter out over area by 18/05z		
11	2248		(b)(1)1.4a REQ: k again to request as much of a 9 line medevac as poss from no words att		
12	2252		(b)(1)1.4a RPTS 10 survivors outside helo, NO FIRE ATT unknown # inside helo,		
13	2255		GROUND QRF WILL BE 30 MIN OUT ONCE THEY SP. CALLSIGN IS (b)(1)1.4a		
14	2258		HH-60s wheels up from KAE - approx flight time 60m - lead AC C/S is (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a ETA 2350Z		
16	2305		instructed to look for (b)(1)1.4a on FD-1 / FD-2, if WR not able secure comms they will be pushed to FD-2 so we can maintain sec comms with		
17	2307		ground qrf to launch at 2315z- eta 2335z, qrf C/S actual is (b)(1)1.4a 1 x platoon from		
18	2313		reports finding it difficult to talk/transmit / intentionally limiting comms with him to avoid additional stress		
19	2314		QRF info passed to att will conduct Far Recognition and direct ARF		
20	2314		FROM REQUEST BLANKETS / POSS HYPO cases among wounded		

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
Case 4:07-cv-06396-CW		Document 80-3		Filed 05/29/2008 Page 9 of 35			
				FROM	TO		
ITEM NO.	TIME	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.			ACTION TAKEN	INL	
	IN	OUT					
21	2318		WX in area reported as 8000k ceilings [REDACTED] at 9k MSL, No visual,				
22	2319		HH-60s requesting onsite wx from air assets - possible wx abort - 76 working ground evac option t (b)(1)1.4a				
23	2323		ISAF trying to push additional elements from (b)(1)1.4a element (b)(1)1.4a notified				
24	2329		(b)(1)1.4a ETA 2345z				
25	2334		New ETA for (b)(1)1.4a is 0001Z				
26	2335		(b)(1)1.4a force has not left - will be traveling NE on HWY 1 - advise (b)(1)1.4a - will advise if elements actually leave (b)(1)1.4a				
27	2343		(b)(1)1.4a Gnd force SP at 2340z ETA to siter is 30-45 min depending on road conditions.				
28	2343		(b)(1)1.4a reporting 18 minutes out at 2342Z				
29	2344		(b)(1)1.4a reports: In comms w/ (b)(1)1.4a Have visual with crash site ATT, crash site 100 Meters West from Hwy 1				
30	2349		(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g				
31	2349		CITF-76 requests initial plan for crash site security once casualties are evac'd				
32	2352		Composition of QRF, 6-8 vehicles in 1st grp / 4 vehicles in 2nd grp				
33	2355		(b)(1)1.4a QRF departed 2317z. BFT not TX. Additional elements departed at 2342Z - second element is 4 vehicles / 19 pax / 1 terp - carrying hypo gear				
34	0000		(b)(1)1.4a on the ground IVO crash site ATT				
35	0002		(b)(1)1.4a askin [REDACTED] for Casu update as soon as poss				
36	0010		Gnd QRF at crash site ATT				
37	0018		(b)(1)1.4a REQ: Weather update of sit (b)(1)1.4a reports: seems clear below 3000' AGL, Snowy conditions on ground.				
38	0028		(b)(1)1.4a report (b)(1)1.4a is loading injured ATT with 4 injured on 1xHH-60 and 5 injured on 2nd HH-60 will go to (b)(1)1.4a				
39	0032		(b)(1)1.4a in contact with (b)(1)1.4a ATT, requested accountability and num/type injuries / destination of evac ASAP, standing by for words				
40	0046		(b)(1)1.4a tell (b)(1)1.4a they are cleared fly singled ship to assist in CASEVAC.				
41	0047		(b)(1)1.4a reports 3 casualties still remain trapped in ac. extracting att				
42	0050		(b)(1)1.4a will launch with 7 crew plus (b)(1)1.4a				
43	0104		(b)(1)1.4a dpt (b)(1)1. ATT ETA crash site 0140z				

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY	SIGNATURE
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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

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ITEM NO.		TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	PERIOD COVERED		INL
		IN	OUT		FROM	TO	
					HOUR	DATE	
					0115z	18 FEB 2007	
44	0115			First MEDEVAC ACFT has landed at (b)(1) ATT. w/ 4 injured			
45	0118			2nd MEDEVAC ACFT has landed at (b)(1) ATT. w/ 5 injured			
46	0123			(b)(1)1.4a new ETA 0145Z ATT			
47	0130			reports personnel status 9 Evac'd, 8 still on ground, 5 unknown.			
48	0134			(b)(1)1.4a DPT (b)(1) ATT enroute to (b)(1) with (b)(1)1.4a will transload injured a (b)(1) vi (b)(1)1.4a 1.4a			
49	0144			(b)(1)1.4a 2 min out from crash site ATT			
50	0147			(b)(1)1.4a arrives crash site ATT			
51	0151			(b)(1)1.4a element holding at (b)(1) - have (b)(1)1.4a advise if further assets needed once situation is assessed			
52	0157			(b)(1)1.4a reports that all remaining minus 1 (12) have been loaded ground force will remain and secure site Enroute to (b)(1) ATT ETA 0245z			
53	0205			(b)(1)1.4a reports 38 mins out for (b)(1) Urgent and 2 Priority			
54	0217			GFC going back to (b)(1)1.4a to get wrecker. ETA back at crash site 0310z			
55	0224			(b)(1)1.4a report 14 min out from (b)(1) request ETA of (b)(1)1.4a ETA is 0241z			
56	0224			(b)(1)1.4a reports 2 Urgent and 2 Priority			
57	0226			request that (b)(1)1.4a take all casualties directly to the CASH			
58	0235			(b)(1)1.4a request assessment from (b)(1)1.4a if aircraft was salvagable			
59	0237			(b)(1)1.4a arrives (b)(1) ATT.			
60	0242			(b)(1)1.4a arrives (b)(1) ATT.			
61	0250			(b)(1)1.4a off station ATT. RTB.			
62	0255			(b)(1)1.4a reports they have transloaded all casualties. (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4a will remain at (b)(1) enroute to crash site have fuel to loiter. (b)(1)1.4a tell (b)(1)1.4a to remain at (b)(1) (b)(1)1.4a returning to (b)(1) ATT.			
63	0301			(b)(1)1.4a request ground transport at from (b)(1)1.4a			
64	0303			(b)(1)1.4a arrives (b)(1) ATT.			
65	0316			(b)(1)1.4a believes w/ additional rescue equipment they can extract last casualty.			

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SIGNATURE

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
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		IN	OUT				
		0316		J3 CHOPS has no objections if (b)(1)1.4a continues to attempt extraction.			
66		0317		CJTF 76 AVN working launch of HH-60 w/extraction equipment ATT will advise when wheels-up			
67		0323		Received that we have lost (b)(1)1.4a personnel ATT. Status of other personnel unknown ATT.		Passed to (b)(1)1.4a	
68		0337		CJTF-76 AVN - HH-60 w/extraction equipment will DPT (b)(1) in 05 min estimated TOF is 60 min			
69		0346		(b)(1)1.4a arrive (b)(1) ATT			
70		0400		Received report that (b)(1) is in (b)(1) with back injury, no further info ATT.			
71		0403		(b)(1)1.4a reports that wrecker is on site ATT. Extraction gear is still 30 min out.			
				(b)(1)1.4a LAUNCHED THE UH AND AH WITH THE JAWS OF LIFE AT 0355Z THEY ARE 1/3 OF THE WAY TO THE CRASH SITE			
72		0417		ETA CRASH SITE 0450Z.			
73		0420		Request (b)(1)1.4a to STAND DOWN / all pax extracted ATT, confirmed by (b)(1)1.4a			
74		0615		Received updated status on (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6) will be moved to (b)(1)		Passed to (b)(1)1.4a	
75		0617		Received report that Quinlan been pronounced KIA.		Passed to (b)(1)1.4a	
76		0618		(b)(1)1.4a @ 0604z enroute to BAF			
77		0730		Alerted (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6) CJTF 76 CH-47s will be launching from (b)(1) taking them to crash site, to assess ACFT 472 and recover sensitive items and take picture. CH-47s will then P/U (b)(1)1.4a and return to BAF. HH-60s from (b)(1) will pick up (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6) pax from crash site and land at drop-off (b)(1)1.4a continue to (b)(1) (b)(1)1.5a, (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6) and return to BAF.			
78		0930		Above plan changed to: (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6) will get on a C-130 at BAF and proceed to (b)(1) will escort remains back to BAF. (b)(1) will escort (b)(1) to Germany, and (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6) board 2xCH-47s from (b)(1) will be taken to crash site for assessment of ACFT 472.			
79		1031		(b)(1)1.4a reports that last 2 WIA arrive (b)(1) ATT			
80		1109					
TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY				SIGNATURE			

40	1608Z	(b)(1)14a	DEP [REDACTED] AT 1607Z
38	17-Feb-07 1554Z	(b)(1)14a	2 ARRIVE [REDACTED] AT 1552Z
38	17-Feb-07 1540Z	(b)(1)14a	2 DEP BAF AT 1535Z
34	17-Feb-07 1502Z	(b)(1)14a	ARR KAF W/ (b)(1)14a
32	17-Feb-07 1447Z	(b)(1)14a	ARRIVE [REDACTED] AT 1447Z
30	17-Feb-07 1433Z	(b)(1)14a	DEP [REDACTED] AT 1430Z
28	17-Feb-07 1410Z	(b)(1)14a	ON STATION AT 1400Z
26	17-Feb-07 1402Z	(b)(1)14a	DEP BAGRAM AT 1401Z
24	17-Feb-07 1308Z	(b)(1)14a	PASSING CP (b)(1)14a
22	17-Feb-07 1243Z	(b)(1)14a	DEP (b)(1)14a W/1 VEH 4 PAX
20	17-Feb-07 1150Z	(b)(1)14a	ARRIVES MSS
18	17-Feb-07 0920Z	(b)(1)14a	ARRIVES US EMBASSY
16	17-Feb-07 0846Z	(b)(1)14a	7 PASSING CP
14	17-Feb-07 0820Z	(b)(1)14a	DEPARTING MSS ENR [REDACTED] W/1 VEH AND 3 PAX
12	17-Feb-07 0631Z	(b)(1)14a	RETURN (b)(1)14a ATT (RTB)
10	17-Feb-07 0458Z	(b)(1)14a	ARRIVE AT SAFE HOUSE ATT
8	17-Feb-07 0430Z	(b)(1)14a	DEPART (b)(1)14a DPN (b)(1)14a UNDERWAY ATT
6	17-Feb-07 0245Z	(b)(1)14a	ARRIVE BAF (b)(1)14a ATT
4	17-Feb-07 0124Z	(b)(1)14a	GROUND COLLECTION AND ASSLT TEAM ARRIVES LOITER POINT
2	17-Feb-07 0041Z	(b)(1)14a	ARRIVE ATT
0	16-Feb-07 2358Z	(b)(1)14a	LOG OPENED

ENTRY #	DATE & TIME	ENTRY	INITIALS
82	18-Feb-07 0318Z	LOG ARCHIVED	
80	18-Feb-07 0242Z	ARR [REDACTED] WSR 0242Z	
78	18-Feb-07 0218Z	GFC DEP CRASH SITE ENR (b)(1) 145 WILL PICK UP WRECKER AND RETURN TO CRASH ETA 0310Z	
76	18-Feb-07 0147Z	ARR CRASH SITE AT 0147Z	
74	18-Feb-07 0115Z	ISSUE RESOLVED WITH TRANSPORTING CASUALTIES TO (b)(1) 145	
72	18-Feb-07 0101Z	FROM [REDACTED] DPS: 9 CASUALTIES ARR [REDACTED] 058Z	
70	18-Feb-07 0049Z	CRASH UPDATE: 3 PAX STILL REMAIN TRAPPED IN AC. WORKING TO EXTRACT ATT	
68	18-Feb-07 0044Z	SECOND HH-60 EVAC 5 ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES TO (b)(1) 145 NO STATUS KNOWN ATT	
66	18-Feb-07 0013Z	JOC LOG WILL NOT ROLL UNTILL SITUATION STABILIZES	
64	17-Feb-07 2359Z	CSAR AT CRASH SITE	
62	17-Feb-07 2346Z	(b)(1) 145 REPORTS VISUAL WITH CRASH SITE, CRASH SITE 100M WEST OF HWY 1	
60	17-Feb-07 2302Z	HH-60 CSAR FROM [REDACTED] LAUNCHED- ETA 2350Z	
58	17-Feb-07 2233Z	IN CONTACT W/ [REDACTED] AT 2231Z MULTIPLE WOUNDED, NO EXACT INFO	
56	17-Feb-07 2211Z	DEP BAF AT 2209Z	
54	17-Feb-07 2205Z	1142 ARR (b)(1) 145 2204Z	
52	17-Feb-07 2143Z	ARR (b)(1) 145 AT 2143Z	
50	17-Feb-07 2041Z	DEP (b)(1) 145 AT 2039Z	
48	17-Feb-07 2004Z	EXFIL OBJ (b)(1) 145 ENR (b)(1) 145 ETA 2130Z	
46	17-Feb-07 1946Z	ARR BAF AT 1943Z	
44	17-Feb-07 1856Z	DEP OBJ [REDACTED] EV AT 1852Z	
42	17-Feb-07 1803Z	DEP OPN (b)(1) 145 1800Z	
	17-Feb-07		

Summary notes:

the MMU had exceptional resources for this significant mascas. The leadership, administration, professionalism, cooperation, and attitude of the providers, nurses, and ancillary staff were noted by each of us to have been beyond reproach and could not have been better. (b)(1)1.4a medics' pre-hospital management and care during evacuation was noted to have been better than anyone could have hoped for under such conditions.

The availability of some supplies, the portable CXR, CT scanner, and the capacity of the blood bank/laboratory were overwhelmed by this incident. By having our full package with blood supply we were able to ameliorate the supply issue and assist the blood bank issue. The use of our I-Stat assisted with the lab issue.

(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

Even though we fell in on a CSH-, we took the package. With such a casualty number with high acuity, the CSH exhausted supplies, and the I-Stat proved very useful in the ICU due to the large number of lab requests and blood requests submitted to their lab department.

Fresh Whole Blood drive was initially delayed because 2 of the first 3 donors donated blood that turned out to be the wrong type because they were incorrect of what they thought they were. New resuscitation protocols recommend a greater use of FFP. Because of this we started carrying at least 4 units in the blood cooler even though we knew they would thaw and expire after 5 days in addition to the two frozen units in the 48 hour box. Our thawed FFP was used early in resuscitation due to the fact that the blood bank needed time to thaw FFP while managing numerous laboratory specimens. All of our thawed FFP was infused before FFP was available from the blood bank. Recommendation: if the SRT is carrying 20 units of PRBC we should carry at least 10 units total of FFP with 5-6 units of thawed since we do not have a hot water bath and sticking bags in SRT personnel's armpits does not work well or rapidly.

Choice of Primary Receiving Facility. Choice of Level III facility at (b)(1)1.4a was an excellent decision. (b)(1)1.4a had facility to receive this number of casualties. An adequate number of providers were available. A functioning CT scanner was invaluable to evaluate the blunt force injuries.

Triage at Scene: Medics at scene, (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a triage decisions were accurate. The three most critically injured patients were brought to early. Recommendation: Continue pre-deployment CTM training

Mascal Preparation at The mascas plan of was in operation at time of casualty and our arrival. The mascas plan had a team provided to each trauma bay. A (b)(1)1.4a wide call resulted in trauma teams being staffed by physicians familiar with KAFH but not full time staff of All casualties received undivided attention by trauma team members. Good communications from task force Med Ops planner ensured ready for casualties. (b)(1)1.4a FOB wide preparations for mascas were in place and fully functional. Recommendation: Recognition for leadership and (b)(1)1.4a medical community for response. Our role at (b)(1)1.4a

Team leader: Initial effort to provide sit rep to task force. Identified need to establish secure communication immediately. Recognized need to work with mortuary affairs (as adequate number of providers had staffed Worked with TOC (b)(1)1.4a Monitored evacuation plans. Ensured positive working relationship with (b)(1)1.4a leadership (Commander and XO). Made contact with at (b)(1)1.4a for stowing of sensitive items and transportation.

CRNA: Serve as airway management expert and assist in management of critically ill patient. Provided particular assistance in monitoring fluid status, acid/base status, oxygenation of most critically ill casualty. Provided invaluable assistance by using team I-stat to provide immediate lab results to critical care physician.

Emergency Medicine physician. Monitored casualties as they left trauma bays to ICU. Specifically, he recognized critical illness of casualty who had been considered hemodynamically uncompromised. Served as oversight to specific casualties in trauma bays. Interacted positively with physician staff on (b)(1)1.4a

note: patient originally arrived at secondary triage facility next to main MMU trauma

area. (b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

note: Estimated arrival 0630z.

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Casualty 12

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

note: Estimated arrival 0630z.

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Casualty 13

note: Estimated arrival 0630z.

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Casualty 14

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Hypothermia: The first wave of casualties all came in hypothermic. The [redacted] team was well aware of the need to warm the facility and CT scanner room. Bair huggers were available for each casualty. The benefits of a better monitoring of core temperature was apparent. The DeRoyal foley catheter with thermistor (DeRoyal Urine Meter Kit with temperature foley catheter, 400 series, Reference 81-080516) would have been of benefit. (I do not have the NSN.) The foley catheter is then attached to the standard ProPac by way of connector cable (needs to be ordered separately) for continuous temperature monitoring. **Recommendation:** DeRoyal foley catheters with connecting cable be stocked by team.

Evacuation Process (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] wisely began to prepare for evacuation very early. Input from team members as to evacuation for each patient was well received by [redacted] medical staff.

MED OPS (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] On the night of 17 FEB 07 I was paged into the JOC at approximately 2150Z. Upon entering the JOC I was informed that we might have a helo down (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] was third in a flight of three returning from a mission in the (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] area. The only information that we had is that the pilot made a brief radio transmission stating the number 2 engine went out and that they were carrying 22 pax. (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] set down in VIC (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] due to extremely poor weather (wind and snow). A flight of F-15s were scrambled to attempt to locate the aircraft and provide CAS if needed. We had no idea at this point what we were dealing with – hard landing no injuries, hard landing some minor injuries, hard landing massive injuries – or catastrophic crash - no survivors. At approximately 2240 the F15s (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] gains comms with one of the injured (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] informs (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] that the AC crashed and there are multiple injured personnel. At 2256Z (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] reports that there are 10 pax outside the AC and 12 still inside. Conventional medevac and (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] can not fly due to weather. At 2259 two HH60 CSAR helos depart (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] ext time of flight is 60 minutes. At 2317 and 2342 elements of a ground QRF departed (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] enroute to the crash site (QRF included 2 medics and a PA). CJTF 76 was requesting that all WIAs be evaced to the (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] although we did not have any good info on the number and type of injuries (up to 22 pax) we knew this would immediately overwhelm them and requested evac to the MMU (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] We were repeatedly told "no" and that they wanted to use the (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] and (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] Reason given for not going to MMU was that there was another operation going on in (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] and they were concerned that they may take casualties and did not want to overload the MMU (they were holding them in reserve). We made the decision to launch the SRT (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] Doc back to (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] via the MC 130 and they began loading at approximately 180030Z. At approximately 180012Z the HH60s reach the crash site and depart with 9 patients at approx 0040Z enroute (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] at this point we still do not know the status of all 22 pax or even the status of the 9 pax headed to (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] I informed CJTF 76 that our team was enroute (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] to reinforce the MMU and that any remaining casualties would be brought there. At approx 0108Z the weather clears enough for (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] head back to the crash site arriving at approx 0147hrs. They loaded 12 of the remaining 13 casualties (13th was trapped in the AC – we did not know the status of the 12 casualties at this point but would later find out that 5 were WIA and 7 were KIA). We instructed (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] and at 0157 they lifted off. At approx 0240 (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] the SRT arrive KAF and begin treating patients at the MMU. By approx 0300 the SRT is able to confirm the names and status of all 12 casualties evaced on (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] We still do not know the names and status of the remaining 10 casualties (1 in AC and 9 a [redacted] By approx 0500Z the weather cleared enough for conventional medevac began moving the 9 casualties from (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] three lifts over a period of several hours (4, 3 and 2). Status and names confirmed by the SRT upon arrival at (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] MMU. SRT continued to provide treatment and interface. At 1655Z the first C-17 evac AC departs for Ramstein GE with 11 of the 14 wounded on board. I recalled the SRT and directed that the (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] remain with the 3 wounded until they were evacuated. At 191545 a C-17 departs (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] for Ramstein GE with 2 WIAs and the (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] The last WIA departed (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] with the (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] DOC at 191930Z.

Disclaimer – all times are approximate and this outlines the highlights not the endless coordination made between TF staff elements, units, CJTF 76 and the SRT. The fact that there

were 14 survivors and no died of wounds was a testimonial to the skill, determination, professionalism, of the SRT, all medical personnel involved, helo crews, the JOC staff, and the air evac system. I am proud, humbled and honored to be part of such an organization.

PA's comments: Every member of (b)(1)1.4a was either killed, VSI or SI except for one (b)(1)1.4a member who has a contusion/sprain to the wrist, and a closed head injury. The (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4a medics performed superbly and are credited with saving 5 VSI/SI casualties. We owe a debt of gratitude to the CSAR team out of (b)(1)1.4a for initially getting to the crash site and evacuating 9 casualties to (b)(1)1.4a.

SRT was able to rapidly join into the casualty treatment at the MMU due to the prior coordination's earlier that day and the previous day. MMU personnel readily accepted our help and there were no questions on qualifications, credentials etc... Throughout the day it became apparent to us that (b)(1)1.4a was one of the most experienced and knowledgeable surgeons there. One of the patients was not doing well, circling the drain with possible ARDS type symptoms, (b)(1)1.4a had all the surgeons in a circle teaching them the new ways of trauma surgery that he has learned from his experience. Anything that (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6) recommended to be done was done without any sign of friction. There were absolutely no egos throughout the entire day from us or them.

We can't say enough about how well the MMU performed. Along with Canadian, Dutch, Australian and British personnel manning the MMU, there were US Army folks from (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6) showed up and took charge of trauma tables. At one point, you could see someone from each nation working feverishly on the same patient with skill and grace like they have worked together for years. Every patient had a CT performed, sometimes multiple. Lab and ICU was top notch considering the situation. They started the walking blood bank and had to turn people away there was so many. Our guys did a great job, but many of the living wouldn't be here without the MMU.

My team was incredible. For guys on their first trip with the unit, you wouldn't know it by their actions and attitudes. They have responded quickly and repeatedly without as much as a bitch or complaint. We went non-stop for 36 plus hours and not once did I see a bit of attitude, temper or lack of determination for caring for the guys.

(b)(1)1.4a did a fantastic job in the JOC. You could not have asked for a better front man for this type of operation. (b)(1)1.4a kept both us and the command informed with not only timely but careful and accurate updates. (b)(1)1.4a coordinated with the Mortuary Affairs folks at (b)(1)1.4a and was able to have the remains processed quickly, accurately, and arranged to have the ramp ceremony at BAF.

Our (b)(1)1.5a communicator, (b)(1)1.4a was the only communicator from the Task Force at the MMU that had secure connectivity with the JOC at Bagram. The only other secure means was (b)(1)1.4a on the other side of (b)(1)1.4a. (b)(1)1.4a's promptness, strict accuracy and attention to detail resulted in the successful accountability of twenty two task force members involved in the helicopter crash. (b)(1)1.4a did an awesome job by running the "TOC" that we set up in the MWR tent.

(b)(1)1.4a liaison (b)(1)1.4a provided us with everything we needed to include a vehicle which we used to shuttle pax and equipment from the cax to (b)(1)1.4a.

The USAF AELT liaison was very helpful, managed to keep the casualty units and names close hold and coordinated the C-17 CCAT teams there on short notice.

(b)(1)1.4a MMU saved our guys lives. Without them, we could have very easily added 3-4 more to the KIA/DOW list.

Issue: use of HPMK's

Discussion: all the casualties were hypothermic. Early use of HPMK's at the crash site or aircraft if practical given the situation would have been preferred. Given the mass casualty situation and the seriousness of injuries, the medics did a great job with wool/space blankets that they had. Recommendation: Look at having a stock of HPMK's on all aircraft and wheeled vehicles in the task force. They can be incorporated in the drop bags for the CCP's.

Issue: (b)(1)1.4a communicator

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

Discussion: BLUF, communications were a huge advantage since we were at a foreign hospital. The ability to talk with the JOC and find out the status and arrival of the first nine casualties, and provide the JOC with the names of the casualties and deceased was invaluable. NOK notification would have taken a lot longer and through other channels without our own RTO.

Recommendation: Sustain the use of (b)(1)1.4a EVERY mission.

Issue: CTM Downed aircraft scenario.

Discussion: Not all casualties are the result of armed conflict. Blunt and violent deceleration injuries are relatively uncommon but equally as deadly. Care under fire must be quickly transitioned to tactical field care and then to casualty evacuation care if no tactical scenario is present. (b)(1)1.4a Medics that have gone through our CTM noted the similarities and were thankful for the mass casualty experience.

Recommendation: sustain the downed aircraft scenario for CTM training modules.

Issue: relationship with (b)(1)1.4a non-medical personnel

Discussion: upon arrival at the MMU, the PA was able to identify the (b)(1)1.4a Platoon Sergeant as the senior man at the scene. Having participated in approx 10 prior missions with that platoon, and having a good relationship with (b)(1)1.4a chain of command allowed the PA to quickly get situational awareness, get accountability of all casualties and start the process of identifying the remains. (b)(1)1.4a personnel had such faith and trust in the SRT from this and numerous prior deployments with other teams, they followed instructions and performed their tasks without question.

Recommendation: Sustain the close relationships we maintain with all (b)(1)1.4a personnel by continuous interactions both in garrison and forward deployed.

(b)(1)1.4a



Pages removed for the following reason: (b)(6). Withheld due to sensitive personal information

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Casualty 8

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

comments: Estimated arrival 0540z

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Departed 1545 enroute LPMC

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Casualties 9 -12 were initially evacuated to (b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6) treated and transported to (b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6) MMU, arr 0625z

Casualty 9

note: Review X-rays with MMU Surgeons.

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Casualty 10

note: patient arrived at secondary triage facility next to main MMU trauma area.

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

note: Estimated arrival 0630z (b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Casualty 11

(b)(3)(10USC1305);(b)(6)



Casualty 6-9 Initial evac to [REDACTED] treatment, transport to [REDACTED] MMU, arr 0538z.

Casualty 6:

[REDACTED] comments: Estimated arrival 0540z

(b)(3)(10USC1305);(b)(6)



Casualty 7:

[REDACTED] note: Reviewed X-ray and diagnosis with MMU provider, no other interaction.


[REDACTED] comments: Estimated arrival 0540z

(b)(3)(10USC1305);(b)(6)



[REDACTED]

(b)(3)(1005C1505)(b)(6)



Casualty 5:

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)(10USC1306)(b)(6)

Departed MMU on board C17 trans 1545z enroute LRMC

(b)(3)(10USC1306)(b)(6)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Comments: Estimated arrival 0230 z.

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Comments: Briefly checked with care team and checked on patient. Plain films and CT reviewed with primary providers.

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

PA comments: good pre-hospital care, recognized the problem, attempted to correct and re-evaluated the procedure.

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

Casualty 4:

(b)(3)(10USC130b)(b)(6)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)(10USC1305)(b)(6)



PA Comments: HPMK a huge success with these hypothermic casualties.

Wounds noted at MMU: (b)(6)



Casualty 2

(b)(3)(10USC1305)(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a



Comments: No interaction beyond seeing he had a care team and reviewing the films with the MMU Orthopaedic surgeon and to provide a HPMK from our package.

Comments: Estimated arrival 0230 z. No pt contact.

(b)(3)(10USC1305)(b)(6)



(b)(3)(10USC1305)(b)(6)



PA Comments: HPMK a huge success with these hypothermic casualties.

Wounds noted at MMU: (b)(3)(10USC1305)(b)(6)



Casualty 3:

(b)(3)(10USC1305)(b)(6)



Comments: [Redacted]

comments: The MMU had clearly prepared with exceptional insight and leadership. Each patient had a physician and team assigned. The SRT Surgeon was ensuring each critical patient was being aggressively addressed. He noted some patients were not in the main bay and asked that I check on them.

PA Comments: prior coordination with the MMU both previous day and mission night proved invaluable. The MMU staff remembered us when we walked in, and the grid I took from the flight line earlier that day was passed over CMD SAT to the helo's inbound with casualties. Wearing the Surg/ER/PA/CRNA patches seemingly provided all the credentials they needed. The MMU surgeons saw Kirby's patch and immediately welcomed him and started a conversation.

Casualties 1-5, evac from crash site direct to MMU, arr 0230z.

(b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)



comments: This patient had the best possible prehospital and post arrival airway management, medical care and surgical intervention. The CT was reviewed with the MAU PA. I had no other interaction beyond a few checks with his care team and to provide a HPMK from our package.


(b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)




**After Action Review, Mass Casualty, Downed MH-47E, Period of Darkness
(POD) 17-18 Feb, AFG.**

Participants

(b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a



Background: On POD 17-18 February, 2007 (b)(1)1.4a was pre-positioned on board a MC-130H at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) to support operation (b)(1)1.4a located in Southwestern AFG. Two COA's for casualty evacuation. COA #1: (b)(1)1.4a evacuates cax directly to Canadian MMU (Multi-national Medical Unit) with SRT co-located. COA # 2 was for the Talon with SRT to transload cax from (b)(1)1.4a. SRT coordinated with MMU upon landing at KAF prior to mission execution then moved back to Talon a (b)(1)1.4a area. MMU capability was listed as 2 x GS, 1 x Ortho, 1 x OMF, 2 x Anesthesiologists, 2 x Anesthesia Techs, 2 x AE crew, 3 x OR tables, 4 x ICU beds, 12 x beds on the OEF medical footprint document produced by med OPS. Mission was not conducted due to lack of trigger. With no trigger, SRT RTB'd to BAF. Upon movement back to BAF, one MH-47 lost power to one of their engines and went down South (b)(1)1.4a. Multiple complications led to a prolonged extraction time: bad weather with poor visibility; no illumination; no or limited comms with downed a/c; CSAR were on downed a/c. CSAR from (b)(1)1.4a and ground unit from (b)(1)1.4a were dispatched to the scene. The other two MH-47's were grounded at (b)(1)1.4a due to weather conditions. F-15's and AC-130's that were overhead reported limited comms with ground force that crawled off helo but provided initial cax report. CSAR Helo from (b)(1)1.4a arrived with a follow-on cax report. With the initial cax report, it was realized that this was not just a helo shutdown without comms, but in fact a crash with multiple injured. The (b)(1)1.4a SRT (b)(1)1.4a PA and (b)(1)1.4a loaded onto a Talon and moved to (b)(1)1.4a MMU.

Initial casevac from crash site was performed by CSAR HH-60's, 5 cax on one, 4 on the other with all nine going to (b)(1)1.4a. Weather cleared enough for the (b)(1)1.4a MH-47 to arrive at crash site and evac 5 cax and 7 KIA to KAF MMU. (b)(1)1.4a Medic, 2 x (b)(1)1.4a were on scene at crash site to pick up cax, and provided enroute treatment to MMU.

SRT arrived at MMU approx 5 mins after initial cax arrived via MH-47. SRT Surg, CRNA (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4a went straight to the MMU. PA, ER and RTO stopped at HLZ transfer point to get situational awareness. At that point, PA started getting accountability of cax and KIA's. RTO and ER took AMST package to MMU to set up comms. ER then went to trauma bay to take care of patients.

One additional KIA required extrication from the a/c and was delivered to (b)(1)1.4a Mortuary Affairs later in the day. Throughout the day all 14 cax were delivered to (b)(1)1.4a.

C-17 CCAT team arrived (b)(1)1.4a o/a 11 hours after cax first arrived MMU. 11 casualties were evacuated, 2 remained to undergo further surgery or to allow the Acute Lung Injury Team from Landstuhl to come on the CCAT the next day. One casualty was expected to be released to the unit. SRT and (b)(1)1.4a Med RTB'd to BAF during POD 18-19 Feb 07 (b)(1)1.4a. (b)(1)1.4a layed at (b)(1)1.4a to ensure the command had SA on the remaining three cax. Two patients were evacuated to Landstuhl the next day, last cax transported to BAF by C-130 with (b)(1)1.4a escort.

[REDACTED]

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION RAE 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 3. TIME 4. FILE NUMBER

(b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

5. DISCLOSURE OF ADDRESS

17 ACOS, Ft. Rucker, GA

9. (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

I, _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I FIRST BECAME AWARE OF THE INCIDENT WHEN I WAS PAGED ABOUT 5:10 PM AFTER THE INCIDENT AND THEN I CAME DIRECTLY TO THE JOL. THE JOL IMMEDIATELY TRIED TO GET SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. WE WERE STILL TREATING THIS AS A MISSING A/C MORE THAN A DOWNED AIRCRAFT BECAUSE THE REPORT FROM FLT LEAD WAS THAT AN AIRCRAFT HAD ENGINE TROUBLE. WE HAD NO COMMS WITH THE A/C. TRIED TO DETERMINE A LOCATION BASED ON LOCATION REPORTED, SEPARATION OF A/C ETC. F15s WERE W/IN THEIR LAUNCH WINDOW AND TASKED TO US SO WE LAUNCHED THEM AND SPUN UP AND LAUNCHED A BURNUP. SENT A/C TO POSSIBLE LOCATION ALONG ROUTE. F15s WERE ON (b)(1) 1.4a PERSONNEL KNEW TO GO TO THAT AREA. THE JOL ESTABLISHED A JOL OVER THE COORDINATES (b)(1) 1.4a. F15s DASH MISC TO AC130, ALSO THEN COMMUNICATED BY VOICE TO F15s. F15 IN VOICE CONTACT WITH ONE SURVIVOR WHO RELATED COORDINATES OBTAINED FROM SURVIVOR'S GPS. THIS LOCATION WAS SUBSTANTIALLY SOUTHWEST ALONG ROUTE THIS WAS UNDOUBTEDLY DUE TO THE TIME IT TAKES WHILE FLYING TO HEAR, MAKE A JUDGMENT, TAKE AN ACTION ETC. HELOS WERE TRAVELLING AT ABOUT 2 NM MIN.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF _____ STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Authority: The general authority for soliciting this information is 10 USC § 3012. More specific authority(ies) may exist.

Purpose: The purpose(s) for soliciting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the commander in determining what action to take with regard to:

MISHAN OF (b)(1) 14a 17 FEB 07 AND THE RESULTING CASUALTIES

Failure to disclose:

For soldiers and civilians not being advised of their Article 31, UCMJ rights and civilians not being advised of the 5th Amendment rights: Providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or Army regulations or applicable civilian personnel regulations.

For soldiers and civilians being advised of their Article 31, UCMJ rights and civilians being advised of the 5th Amendment rights: Providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than that certain information might not otherwise be available to the commander for his or her decision in this matter.

Routine Uses: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies outside of the Department of Defense.

(b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

DATE / MAR 07

1607 Z

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

A/C PRIMARY OF CONFIRMING THE SITE WAS VOICE NOT VISUALLY. AS THE
MART WENT ON A/C BEGAN TO SEE THE SITE VISUALLY, THROUGH A HOLE IN
THE CLOUDS

PRIOR TO GETTING LEAD FROM SURVIVOR WE MARKED A (b)(1) 1.4a TO DO
SOME (b)(1) 1.4a OF AREA, WHICH FOUND THE HELO AFTER THE
SURVIVOR CALLED THE LOCATION.

QZS COULDN'T COME UP (b)(1) 1.4a SO UNIT KM WAS USED.

WHEN CACD LAUNCHED INTERVAL THEY ESTABLISHED A 10Z (b)(1) 1.4a MI RADIUS
LOTS OF CONFUSION AS PEOPLE THOUGHT (CITF TO) THERE WAS BEEN A NAME CHANGE
AND ALT CHANGE. PROBLEM WAS KIS, CISO, ABOVE 14,000. FINALLY 10Z (b)(1) 1.4a
RE-ESTABLISHED

NOTHING FOLLOWS

(b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6) [REDACTED] WITHOUT
THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to
administer oaths, this 1 day of MAY, 07
at BAF

(b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

(b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

		(b)(6)	(b)(1)1.5a		
PV2	THOMAS KRISTPHER D				
PFC	GARBS RYAN C				

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing
Follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION BAF	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20070301	3. TIME 1645Z	4. FILE NUMBER
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5. (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

8. (b)(1) 1.5a

9. (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

I, _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

CALLED INTO JOL W/IN MINUTES OF RPT OF A/C DOWN. TRYING TO DETERMINE STATUS OF A/C AND GET COMMS. WORKED OFF GRID PASSED BACK BY AIR MEN CDR. STARTED TO LOOK AT OPTIONS WHICH INCLUDED GROUND QRF IN VICINITY AND MEDICAL FROM (b)(1) 1.4a ONLY WHEN A BREAK IN CLOUDS OCCURRED AND F15 GAVE A GRID THIS WAS ALMOST AT THE SAME TIME AS THE SURVIVOR JOL REQUESTED (b)(1) 1.4a FOR MEDICAL. JOL HAS DISCUSS WITH MEDICAL UNIT PRIOR TO CONTACTING / REQUESTING PERMISSION FROM (b)(1) 1.4a JOL BROUGHT MEDICAL TO 15 MIN ALERT STATUS (TIME APPROX 2145). JOL ONLY KNEW THERE WERE PEOPLE OUTSIDE AND INSIDE A/C BUT DID NOT KNOW EXTENT OF INJURIES. THE HELOS ARE CSAR. AIR FORCE DOES NOT HAVE ANY MEDICAL A/C WHICH _____ IS LOW THREAT ENVIRONMENT. CSAR THE SURVIVOR WHO RADIOED AIRCRAFT WAS A GND ELEM NCO. NCO WAS IN AND OUT DUE TO INJURIES AND HE WASN'T VISIBLE SO HE COULDN'T MAKE ANY ASSESSMENTS OF OTHER SURVIVORS. AFTER 2x HH60 MEDICAL 9 PERSONNEL BEGAN TO EXAMINE OPTIONS TO GET REMAINING 15 PERSONNEL OUT. EVENTUALLY MANT ORDERED SOUTH AS WX IMPROVED.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES

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For use of this form, see AR 190-45, the proponent agency is FPMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060227	3. TIME 1000 Z	4. FILE NUMBER
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(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC, 160th SOAR(A)

9. (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

I, _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Background information.

- Overall flt time ~~2500 HRS~~ 2000 + HRS
- MH47D MH47E 250 + HRS
- Years in Avn 15 YRS
- Years in 160th 4 YRS
- Number of deployments and months in: Iraq 3/6 Afghan 8/20 months

Pre-mission. Summarize pre-mission planning to include what the mission was, length of time between warning order to execution, whether rehearsals were conducted, and what aspects of the mission were you most concerned about.

THE MISSION WAS THE RETURN OF THE FLIGHT BACK TO BAF. LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN WARNING TO EXEC WAS AROUND 2 HRS. THOUGH THE PLAN TO RETURN WAS ONGOING ALL THAT DAY. CREW BRIEF WAS CONDUCTED. WEATHER WAS MY MAJOR CONCERN.

During the briefing what aspect(s) were stressed more than others?

WEATHER, TIME EN ROUTE.

Pilots: According to your performance planning how would the loss of an engine affect your ability to maintain flight or perform certain maneuvers required by the mission?

Mission Execution. Briefly summarize the mission from aircraft crank to when you first became aware of the problem with

(b)(1) 1.4a How did you first find out?

Describe your aircraft's airspeed, altitude and the weather conditions at this time.

HIT CHECK WAS DONE ON THE GROUND IN CHALK ORDER. WE FLEW FOR ABOUT 20 MIN BEFORE WE HIT WEATHER. BECAME AWARE OF PROBLEM WITH (b)(1) WHEN THEY ANNOUNCED OVER THE RADIO THAT THEY HAD #2 ENGINE FAILURE.

CASEVAC EQUIPMENT:

AID BAG *

OXYGEN

HOLDABLE BREATH

PROPAQ FOR VITAL SIGN MONITORING

FRACTURE SPLINTS

LITTERS

POWERED SUCTION

BLANKETS

* AID BAG:

TOWNIQUETS, CHEST SEALS, I.V. FLUIDS, BANDAGES, DRESSINGS.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

When you became aware of the problem with (b)(1) 1.4a what actions did your aircraft perform immediately after hearing of the situation and actions taken after you left the scene. What specific roles did you perform?

WE CONTINUED THE FLIGHT TO (b)(1) 1.4a MY ROLE IS THAT OF FLIGHT MEDIC AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF A CASEVAC MISSION. I HAVE NO CREW DUTY STATION.

Are you aware of any issues with the reliability of the aircrafts engines?

NO

Do you have anything further you would like to add?

NO

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR REWARD, WITHOUT

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of MAY, 2007 at BAF (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES